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BENEFIT CORPORATIONS: THE NEED FOR SOCIAL
FOR-PROFIT ENTITY LEGISLATION IN NORTH DAKOTA
ABSTRACT
The benefit corporation is an emerging type of business entity that
allows for-profit companies to consider social consequences in company
decision-making processes. In April 2010, Maryland became the first state
to pass benefit corporation legislation. Since then, thirty-one states,
including Delaware, have passed similar legislation. Despite North
Dakota’s uniquely shareholder-friendly laws, the state legislature has yet to
adopt benefit corporation legislation. Creating a business entity that
modifies traditional notions about corporations would create some business
and legal uncertainty; however, there may be a need for a business form that
is unrestrained by the existing wealth maximization corporate model.
Given the surge in capital investment and economic activity in North
Dakota, the following note will explain why the state should consider
benefit corporation legislation as a means to foster socially conscious
business development.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In June 2012, the Reputation Institute, a private global consulting firm
headquartered in New York, conducted a research project inviting 47,000
consumers from across fifteen markets to participate in a study that ranked
the world’s one hundred most reputable companies.1 The study showed
that a person’s willingness to buy, work for, and invest in companies is
predominantly based on perceptions of the company over perceptions of the
product.2 In the wake of large corporate scandals like Enron3 and
WorldCom,4 it should come as no surprise that consumers, employees, and
investors make decisions based on a company’s corporate social
responsibility practices.
Although theories of corporate social
responsibility and social entrepreneurship are not novel, there is an upswing

1. Jacquelyn Smith, The Companies with the Best CSR Reputations, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2012),
http://www forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2012/12/10/the-companies-with-the-best-csrreputations/3/.
2. Id. (explaining that willingness to buy is sixty percent based on the perception of the
corporation and only forty percent based on the perception of the product).
3. See generally Enron:
The Real Scandal, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 19. 2002),
http://www.economist.com/node/940091 (detailing how Enron, the Texas-based energy-trading
company, declared bankruptcy as a result of poor corporate governance and lack of corporate
social responsibility).
4. See generally The Great Telecoms Crash, THE ECONOMIST (July 18, 2002),
http://www.economist.com/node/1234886 (explaining how WorldCom, the long distance phone
company now known as MCI, filed for bankruptcy due to corporate executives inflating company
assets).
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in demand for socially responsible products, employers, and investment
opportunities as a result of continued public scandal.5
TOMS, a shoes company, is one among several notable social
enterprises created in response to this demand. Founder Blake Mycoskie
created TOMS in 2006 after being inspired by children in Argentina
without shoes.6 He created a for-profit corporation matching every pair of
shoes purchased with a donated pair of new shoes for a child in need.
Through a partnership with National Relief Charities, TOMS has donated
shoes to children living in federal Indian reservations, including
reservations in North Dakota.7 The Body Shop, a subsidiary of L’Oreal, is
another noteworthy example of a socially conscious corporation.8 The
Body Shop’s core competencies include positive environmental practices,
using trade products, defending human rights, and campaigning against
animal testing.9 Having recognized the difficulties faced by corporations
pursuing social missions, The Body Shop has voluntarily implemented
social auditing practices to increase their social accountability.10 Other
companies, like TOMS, have opted in favor of creating for-profit
corporations
with
non-profit subsidiaries to circumvent the limitations of being a corporation
with a social mission.11 Others still have taken a different approach,
rejecting for-profit corporations entirely in favor of not-for-profit entities.
These companies argue that the traditional corporate purpose of shareholder
wealth maximization embedded in the concept of a corporation is “wholly
incompatible” with social and charitable missions.12
Most scholars find themselves ideologically somewhere in the middle.
They acknowledge that the corporate form limits the ability of companies to
achieve social missions, but applaud company-initiated programs like social
audits and not-for-profit subsidiaries. Regardless of variations along the
ideological spectrum, all socially conscious groups continue to lobby for the
5. Nate Holzapfel, The Rise of Social Entrepreneurship, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 12,
2014
11:00
AM),
http://www huffingtonpost.com/nate-holzapfel/the-rise-of-socialentrep_b_6304280 html.
6. One-For-One, TOMS, http://www.toms.com/one-for-one-en.
7. Kelly Gibson, TOMS Shoes Giving Partners, NAT’L RELIEF CHARITIES BLOG (Feb. 12,
2012), http://blog.nrcprograms.org/toms-shoes-giving-partners/.
8. Our
Company,
THE
BODY
SHOP,
http://www.thebodyshop.com/content/
services/aboutus_company.aspx.
9. Id.
10. Social and Environmental Reporting, THE BODY SHOP, http://www.thebodyshop.com.au/
about-us/social-and-environmental-reporting.aspx.
11. One-for-One, TOMS, http://www.toms.com.
12. Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors’
Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaries, 59 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 409, 411 (2002).
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creation of business forms that better facilitate social entrepreneurship. In
thirty-one states,13 legislators have responded to these requests by creating
public benefit corporations: a new type of business entity that allows forprofit
companies
to
prioritize
social
outcomes
in
14
North Dakota is a state that has yet to adopt public
decision-making.
benefit corporation legislation.15 Therefore, the purposes of this note are
twofold: to determine how this new business entity differs from traditional
corporate law and to debate whether adopting legislation creating such an
entity is a viable means of promoting corporate social responsibility in
North Dakota.
II. BACKGROUND
In debating the need for a new legal entity, it is important to understand
the evolution and shortcomings of traditional corporate law. Two
seemingly inconsistent conceptions exist regarding the purpose of the
corporation.16 The first concept postulates that the “primary purpose of the
corporation is to maximize share value for shareholders.”17 The second
recognizes that corporations do not operate in a vacuum, and, as a result, are
responsible for considering the concerns of constituents such as employees,
customers, creditors, and the community.18 The former view is the more
conventional of the two views and is known as the “shareholder primacy
model.”19 The following section outlines the evolution of the model. It
also explains that while constituency statutes were enacted to address some
13. State
by
State
Legislative
Status,
BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER,
http://www.benefitcorp net/state-by-state-legislative-status (listing states that have enacted Benefit
Corporation legislation: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington D.C., and West
Virginia). States that have introduced Benefit Corporation Legislation include: Alaska, Kentucky,
New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oklahoma. Id.
14. What
is
a
Benefit
Corporation?,
BENEFIT
CORP.
INFO. CENTER,
http://www.benefitcorp net.
15. See State by State Legislative Status, supra note 13. During the 64th Legislative
Assembly of North Dakota, Representative Klemin introduced House Bill No. 1237, “A BILL for
an Act to create and enact chapter 10-37 of the North Dakota Century Code, relating to North
Dakota public benefit corporations.” See H.B. 1237, 64th Legis. Assemb., 64th Reg. Sess. (N.D.
2015). On January 27th, 2015, the House of Representatives passed the bill with 87 yeas and 6
nays. On March 24th, 2015, the Senate failed to pass the bill after a second reading with 2 yeas
and 44 nays. North Dakota Bill Actions: HB 1237, NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE BRANCH,
http://www.legis nd.gov/assembly/64-2015/bill-actions/ba1237 html.
16. Fairfax, supra note 12, at 430.
17. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Representing Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 216
(2013).
18. Fairfax, supra note 12, at 432.
19. Id. at 430.
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of the model’s shortcomings, these statutes have deficiencies of their own,
perpetuating the need for additional legislation.
A. TRADITIONAL CORPORATE LAW
The concept behind the shareholder primacy model is routed in both
legal and economic principals. Proponents argue that “shareholders are the
property owners of the corporation and, therefore, are entitled to legal
protection of their property—their invested capital.”20 Because directors
hold shareholders’ property in trust, they owe fiduciary duties of undivided
loyalty, care, and fair dealing.21 Other proponents of the shareholder
primacy model base their theory on principals of contract law. They argue
that a corporation is “essentially a web of contractual relations forming a
‘nexus of contracts.’”22
The relationship between a director and
shareholder is contractual in nature and governed by principals of agency.23
Implicit in the contract is an understanding that directors will perform their
legal duty to promote shareholder interests, which is subordinate to other
stakeholder concerns.24 Because shareholders have “relatively little
external influence over the corporation,” some argue that it is appropriate
for directors to protect shareholder interests above the interests of other
constituent groups who have the ability to enter into and negotiate their own
contracts.25 The view is argued as not only “descriptively accurate,” but
also “normatively appropriate.”26
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.27 is a foundational case supporting the
shareholder wealth maximization model. In Dodge, shareholders brought
suit after Henry Ford, founder and director of Ford Motor Company,
refused to pay out shareholder dividends.28 Instead of issuing dividends,
Ford intended to use corporate revenues to make cars more affordable for
the public.29 The court refused to afford Henry Ford deference as a director
of the corporation and ordered him to pay out shareholder dividends.30 The
court used Ford’s statements regarding his altruistic intent to help his

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 431.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 432.
Id.
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
Id. at 670.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 684-85.
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workers and general consumers as evidence of a violation of his fiduciary
duties to stockholders.31
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews Forbes Holdings is another landmark case
supporting shareholder wealth maximization.32 In Revlon, the defendants
sought to enjoin an agreement entered into by Revlon’s board of directors
during a hostile takeover because it was not in the best interests of the
shareholders.33 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
decision to enjoin the agreement thereby establishing that a director’s duty
is to maximize shareholder value, without regard to other constituencies,
when a takeover of a company is inevitable.34
B. CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
In direct response to Revlon, several states have adopted constituency
statutes that permit directors to consider non-shareholder interests. In
essence, directors are allowed to consider the interests of certain
stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and the
community when fulfilling their fiduciary duties.35 These statues help
modernize the business judgement rule36 by explicitly protecting decisions
that consider non-shareholder interests from derivative actions.37 Directors
are protected even when their decisions seem to counter the traditional
priority of shareholder wealth maximization.38 Some scholars argue that by
adopting constituency statutes, the traditional shareholder maximization

31. See, e.g., id. at 671 (“My ambition, declared Mr. Ford, is to employ still more men; to
spread the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help them build up
their lives and their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share of our profits back into
the business.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
33. Id. at 176.
34. Id. at 182.
35. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L.
REV. 971, 973-74 (1992).
36. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (explaining that the business
judgment rule is a standard of judicial review employed by courts when they are asked to evaluate
the business decisions made by corporate boards of directors. It is a rebuttable presumption that
corporate business decisions are made by disinterested directors, acting “on an informed basis, and
in the good faith belief that the decisions are in the best interests of the” corporation and its
shareholders. Unless that presumption can be rebutted successfully by proving to the court that
the directors violated their fiduciary duties and are therefore unable to claim the rule’s protection,
a court will dismiss any lawsuit challenging a board’s business decision.).
37. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 509 (9th ed. 2009) (“A suit by a beneficiary of a fiduciary to
enforce a right belonging to the fiduciary; esp., a suit asserted by a shareholder on the
corporation’s behalf against a third party (usu. a corporate officer) because of the corporation’s
failure to take some action against the third party.”).
38. Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 989.
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model has been abandoned.39 So far, thirty-one states have adopted some
variation of these statutes with material differences among them. 40 In 2007,
North Dakota enacted a constituency statute as a part of the North Dakota
Business Corporation Act. The statute reads as follows:
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may,
in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the
interests of the corporation’s employees, customers, suppliers, and
creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and
societal considerations, and the long-term as well as the short-term
interests of the corporation and its shareholders, including the
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued
independence of the corporation.41
While North Dakota’s constituency statute gives directors some
protection in decision-making, it is not as encompassing as public benefit
corporation legislation. First, the language in the statute merely permits,
but does not mandate, the consideration of non-shareholder interests. It
provides that a director “may”42 consider non-shareholder interests and that
those who do are not necessarily in breach of director standards of conduct.
Unlike public benefit legislation, North Dakota’s constituency statute does
not require directors to consider non-shareholder interests nor does it
include consequences for entities in breach of their social mandate and
mission. Therefore, whether and to what degree non-shareholder interests
should be considered is left to the discretion of directors. There is neither a
legal requirement of directors to justify disregarding other stakeholders nor
a need to justify only giving these interests a cursory review.
Consequently, while the permissive language may protect directors, “it
properly does not and should not vest rights, benefits, or even expectations
in non-shareholders.”43
39. William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 277 (1992) (“[W]hat arguably is eradicated is the command . . . that
maximizing the financial interests of shareholders through lawful means over some period of time
is the core duty of a corporate director.”); see also Ronald M. Gree, Shareholders as Stakeholders:
Changing Metaphors of Corporate Governance, 50 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1409, 1412-14 (1993)
(arguing that the passing of constituency statutes demonstrates the erosion of the traditional
shareholder-primacy view).
40. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 351.347 (2001); N.Y.
BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2007); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4(1) (2007); WIS. STAT. § 180.0827 (2002). See also John Tyler,
Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C Fiduciary Duties
and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 131–38 (2010) (providing a detailed discussion of
constituency statutes).
41. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2013).
42. Id.
43. Tyler, supra note 40, at 134.
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This permissive language is not unique to North Dakota. Connecticut
is the only state that mandates the consideration of non-shareholder
Furthermore, Connecticut’s mandate only applies if a
interests.44
corporation is publicly traded and is undergoing a change of control.45
Therefore, if North Dakota were to propose changes to its constituency
statute’s permissive language and mandate consideration of
non-shareholder interests—as opposed to creating public benefit
corporations—the state would be a pioneer. Yet, such an amendment
would lack a successful model for guidance.
Even if the permissive language in North Dakota’s constituency statute
was successfully changed, the statute’s limited applicability is still a
compelling concern. Similar to other states, North Dakota’s statute applies
only to directors and does not include other key corporate participants such
as agents and officers who are tasked with daily decision-making on behalf
of the corporation. According to the statute’s existing language, only
directors are afforded protection for making decisions that consider
non-stakeholder interests.
In contrast, benefit corporations provide more inclusive protection for
other decision makers through agency theory. Agency is defined as the
fiduciary relationship that arises when a principal assents to an agent acting
on behalf of the principal and the agent accepts.46 Once an agency
relationship has been created, agents owe various fiduciary duties, including
duties of loyalty, care, good faith, and fair dealing to the principal.47 By
including social or environmental concerns as the primary purpose of the
corporation, public benefit corporations provide protection to agents by
giving them implicit authority to make socially conscious decisions.
Officers and agents of such corporations have the implied48 and, in some

44. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2008) (“[A] director of a corporation which has a class
of voting stock registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . may
consider, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,
(1) the long-term as well as the short-term interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the
shareholders, long-term as well as short-term, including the possibility that those interests may be
best served by the continued independence of the corporation, (3) the interests of the corporation’s
employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, and (4) community and societal considerations
including those of any community in which any office or other facility of the corporation is
located.”).
45. Id.
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
47. Id. at § 8.01-08.
48. Id. at § 2.01 cmt. b (“Implied authority is often used to mean actual authority either (1) to
do what is necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform an agent’s express
responsibilities or (2) to act in a manner in which an agent believes the principal wishes the agent
to act . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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instances, the actual authority49 to make decisions in furtherance of the
corporation’s social objectives. Consequently, adopting public benefit
corporation legislation would provide more inclusive agent and employee
protection for socially conscious decision-making as compared to North
Dakota’s existing constituency statute that only protects directors.
A third area of concern regarding constituency statutes is the narrow
scope of non-shareholder interests protected. While North Dakota’s list of
protected shareholder interests is relatively comprehensive and includes
employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, the economy, the community,
and society, by specifically listing such interests the language inherently
limits the non-shareholder interests protected by the statute.50 In contrast,
benefit corporation legislation provides corporations with more autonomy
and freedom to create unique and innovative public benefits. By not listing,
and therefore limiting, protected interests, public benefit corporation
legislation provides a broader scope of protected non-shareholder interests.
For example, benefit legislation provides protection for companies wanting
to provide “low-income or underserved individuals or communities with
beneficial products or services.”51 Under the legislation, corporations are
specifically encouraged to provide beneficial products and services, perhaps
at lower prices than the consumer is willing to pay. In contrast, directors
who prioritize low-income individuals at the expense of shareholders could
be held liable for a breach of fiduciary duties under Ford’s precedent and
North Dakota’s existing constituency statute.
Although North Dakota’s constituency statue is facing the same
criticisms as other state statutes, the drafters were successful in certain
regards. While some constituency statutes apply exclusively to situations
where corporations are undergoing a takeover or structural changes, North
Dakota’s statute provides broad applicability, including, but not limited to,
merger and acquisition contexts.52 North Dakota’s constituency statute also
has correctly included language that permits both long and short-term
considerations, as opposed to permitting only short-term interests.53
Despite these triumphs, however, when read as a whole, North Dakota’s
49. Id. at § 2.01 (“An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of taking action that
has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the
principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”).
50. Tyler, supra note 40, at 134.
51. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 (B Lab 2013).
52. Fairfax, supra note 12, at 474 (noting that one third of the states limit the statute to the
takeover and structural changes contexts); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(6) (2013) (“[I]ncluding
the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the
corporation.”) (emphasis added).
53. Fairfax, supra note 12, at 462 n.292.
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statute “merely create[s] the potential for ‘socially responsible directors’ to
afford some degree of consideration to the effects of decisions on nonshareholder interests, which is a far cry from being able to prefer nonshareholder interests over shareholder interests.”54 To conclude that North
Dakota’s statute overrules the traditional notion of shareholder wealth
maximization as the first and foremost priority would be to misread the
statute.55
Case law does not seem to supplement what the statute is lacking. In
Production Credit Association of Fargo v. Ista, the North Dakota Supreme
Court noted “an officer or director of a corporation owes a fiduciary duty to
the corporation and its stockholders.”56 The court stated that “a director’s
first duty is to act in all things of trust wholly for the benefit of the
corporation”57 and continued by citing to the North Dakota Century Code
section that states a director must act “in a manner the director reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.”58 While considering
what is in the corporation’s best interest, however, the court failed to clarify
whether a director may prioritize non-shareholder over shareholder
interests.
Furthermore, the court derived its authority from an
encyclopaedia that states “directors of a corporation are entrusted with the
management of its business and property for the benefit of all the
shareholders and occupy the position of trustees for the collective body of
shareholders in respect to such business.”59 It is a director’s duty to
“administer corporate affairs for the common benefit of all the
shareholders . . . .”60 This language strongly supports the conclusion that
any non-shareholder interests are subordinate interests.
As a result, public benefit corporation legislation is still necessary in
North Dakota despite the existence of a constituency statute. The current
statute “lack[s] enforcement mechanisms [and] standing provisions that
hold directors accountable for inadequately considering non-shareholder
interests.”61 The result is an expansion of the business judgment
presumption as a defense mechanism used by directors, as opposed to a

54.
55.
56.
57.
1986)).
58.
59.
60.
61.

Tyler, supra note 40, at 134 (emphasis added).
Id.
451 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1990).
Id. (quoting FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 838 (3d ed.
Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50 (1989)).
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 838 (3d ed. 1986).
Id.
Tyler, supra note 40, at 135.
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right vested in non-shareholders.62 The statute also does not include any
requirement that “directors favor or prioritize non-shareholder interests over
those of shareholders.”63 The result is a statute that affords no general
protection for directors “motivated by a desire to maximize benefits to
non-shareholder interests when doing so has no legitimate benefit to
shareholders.”64
If a director prioritizes non-shareholder interests over shareholder
interests and wealth maximization, a director may still be held accountable
through several means. The director may still be subject to legal liability
for breaches of fiduciary duties. Because shareholders elect directors,65 the
director may also be removed or passed-up for renewal at the end of his or
her term. Director and manager compensation in traditional corporations
are still linked to share price and other profitability measures. Therefore, if
shareholder wealth maximization is not a director’s primary agenda,
directors may see their compensation suffer. Finally, directors must also be
wary of competitors who take market share or pursue takeover strategies
based on shareholder value as their objective.
III. ANALYSIS
In response to the shortcomings in constituency statutes and company
struggles to fit within the confines of the traditional shareholder wealth
maximization model, B Lab,66 a non-profit organization has facilitated the
creation of model benefit corporation legislation. William H. Clark, Jr., a
renowned attorney from Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, drafted the “model
legislation.”67 Some of Clark’s most notable work includes the draft and
legislation strategy that lead to the enactment of the North Dakota Publicly
Traded Corporations Act.68 With Clark’s help, North Dakota enacted the
first state corporation law in the United States that addresses “all of the
major issues of corporate governance that are of concern to institutional
investors.”69 In the public benefit corporation arena, Clark has drafted

62. Id. (citing Kathleen Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder
Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 825 (2003)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 137.
65. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03 (2007). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141k(d)
(2014).
66. Benefit Corp. Info. Center, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://benefitcorp.net/about-blab.
67. William H. Clark, Jr., DRINKERBIDDLE, http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/people/
attorneys/clark-william-h.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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benefit statutes that have been enacted in seven states, including California
and New York.70 In light of the shortcomings in North Dakota’s
constituency statute, the following is a discussion about the model public
benefit corporation legislation that could be adopted in North Dakota. The
model legislation was initially created by Clark, but has “evolved based on
comments from corporate attorneys in the states in which the legislation has
been passed or introduced.”71
A. MODEL LEGISLATION PROVISIONS
Under the model legislation, public benefit corporations are defined as
“traditional corporations, incorporated under a state’s general corporate law,
that have elected to be subject to special provisions that impose stricter
accountability and transparency requirements and explicitly alter some
traditional corporate norms.”72 The model legislation only applies to
corporations that elect to be subject to the regulation; therefore, benefit
corporations are simultaneously subject to the state’s corporate laws.
The legislation allows corporations to pursue both specific and general
public benefits. Specific public benefits include providing low income
housing, promoting economic opportunities for individuals and
communities beyond job creation, protecting the environment, promoting
the arts and science, funding companies with a purpose to benefit society,
and improving human health.73 Because specifically listing benefits
inherently limits the ability of corporations to pursue different missions, the
legislation differs from constituency statutes by simultaneously allowing
the pursuit of general public benefits. General public benefits are defined
as “material positive impact[s] on society and the environment, taken as a
whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the business and
operations of a benefit corporation.”74 The concept of general public
benefit requires directors and managers to consider the effects of their
business actions on society and the environment “as a whole.”75
General public benefits also help to prevent companies from naming a
single benefit and then dismissing all other non-financial interests. For
example, Company A, with a general public benefit purpose, could not list
producing affordable widgets as a specific purpose and then dismiss all
70. Id.
71. Interested in Passing Benefit Corp. Legislation?, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER,
http://benefitcorp net/interested-in-passing-legislation.
72. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 101(c) (B Lab 2013).
73. Id. at § 102.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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other stakeholder concerns, such as keeping Company A’s neighboring
wetland free of toxins produced by its manufacture of widgets. Under the
public benefit legislation, Company A would be required to consider
environmental impacts while pursuing its low-price widget business
strategy.
The process of creating a public benefit corporation is similar to the
existing process of incorporation. The company must choose a business
name, obtain a registered agent, reserve the business name, and create an
article or certificate of incorporation depending on the state of
incorporation.76 The only difference is that the articles or certificate of
incorporation must state that the company is a benefit corporation.77
Existing corporations may also elect to be a public corporation by either
amending their articles of incorporation or by undergoing a fundamental
transaction, like a merger or acquisition, with a benefit corporation.78 Both
amendments and fundamental transactions require a minimum status vote,
typically a two-thirds supermajority of voting shareholders.79
A company may terminate its status as a public benefit corporation by
amending its articles of incorporation to delete the benefit provision or by
merging or acquiring a non-benefit corporation.80 The legislation provides
both flexibility and protection for the benefit corporation status by requiring
the amendment to have the minimum status vote required to have
established the public benefit corporation status.81 Substantial sales of the
corporation’s assets will not automatically terminate the status of the
corporation.82 Rather, such sales will terminate the operation of the
business—a similar effect to terminating benefit status.83
Enforcement mechanisms for public benefit corporations that have
undertaken to maximize outcomes for stakeholders do not come from
governmental oversight but rather from transparency and accountability
provisions included in the model legislation. Public benefit corporations
are required to “prepare an annual benefit report that assesses . . .
performance in creating general public benefit against a third-party
standard . . . . “84 An independent entity develops the third-party standards
76. How
to
Form
a
New
Business
Entity,
STATE
http://corp.delaware.gov/howtoform.shtml.
77. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 103 (B Lab 2013).
78. Id. at § 104.
79. Id.
80. Id. at §105.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at §102.
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that assess company compliance in an attempt to provide a protection
against potential abuse of the benefit corporation status.85 The evaluation
criteria is publicly available in an attempt provide transparency.86 The
third-party standard also provides consistency and impartiality by allowing
the independent entity to develop a niche expertise in assessing corporate
social performance.
Public benefit corporations differ from traditional corporations by
requiring the provision of extensive financial statements and annual benefit
reports. Although the Securities Exchange Commission already requires
substantial financial disclosures, the annual benefit report is required
because a corporation’s success in creating general or specific public
benefits is not always readily determinable from financial statements. The
report is intended to reduce “greenwashing,” a phenomenon of businesses
trying to portray themselves as being more environmentally and socially
responsible then they are in reality.87 It provides both consumers and the
general public a way of evaluating whether businesses are fulfilling their
corporate social responsibility claims.
The annual benefit report also allows shareholders to hold directors
accountable.
Because shareholders are responsible for electing a
corporation’s board of directors, the report is a resource shareholders can
use to decide whether directors should be retained or dismissed. More
importantly, unlike the typical derivative action, the model legislation
creates “benefit enforcement proceedings” whereby shareholders can bring
suit for a corporation’s failure to pursue or create the public benefits
enumerated in the articles of incorporation.88
Although in theory
shareholders can bring derivative actions against directors for failing to
pursue social missions, shareholders would have difficulty successfully
arguing that a director breached a fiduciary duty by maximizing shareholder
profits.
B. IMPLICATIONS
As exemplified above, the model legislation has several provisions that
differ from traditional principles and theories of corporate law.
Consequently, if enacted, the provisions would have both intended and
unintended consequences. The following section outlines some of these

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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legal and business implications while highlighting meritorious critiques of
the proposed legislation.
1. Legal Implications
Benefit corporations are particularly enticing for states without
constituency statutes in liquidity scenarios. As a result of Revlon, directors’
protection by the business judgment rule is narrowed, requiring directors to
take the highest offer regardless of the decision’s impact on non-financial
stakeholder interests.89 Although North Dakota has a constituency statute,
the state may still reap the benefits of the model legislation. Due to the lack
of case law in all circuits, North Dakota lawyers and the directors and
officers they counsel are provided with little clarity about how a court
would rule if, during liquidation, a director “made a decision based on
broader considerations than just the highest offer.”90
The legislation also affects director fiduciary duties. While the
business judgment rule affords directors some degree of deference in
considering non-financial interests, decision-making is still constrained to
shareholder wealth maximization. As exemplified by Ford, directors must
take care to frame a decision that considers non-financial interests to appear
as a decision that increases share value. Whether discussing these decisions
in board meetings with discoverable minutes or subsequently justifying
these decisions in court, directors and officers must, at minimum, carefully
select their language to characterize the decision as eventually beneficial to
share price. While constituency statutes afford greater protection for
directors, they do little for companies, employees, consumers, and
shareholders who want to require, rather than just permit, directors to
consider non-financial interests.
2. Business Implications
While legal constraints play an important role in director and officer
decision-making, corporate culture can play an even larger role. Generally,
“shareholder wealth maximization is usually accepted as the appropriate
goal in American business circles.”91 This norm is deeply embedded within
American corporate culture and tradition. Therefore, despite the existence
of some business judgment protection and the permissive language of
constituency statutes, directors, officers, and many lawyers believe their
89. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
90. Legal FAQ’s, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CENTER, http://benefitcorp net/attorneys/legal-faqs.
91. Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001).
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actions are constrained to solely acting in furtherance of shareholder
interests.92 Of those directors who believe social responsibility is
important, several believe that the social responsibility of business is solely
to increase profits.93 Although case law such as Revlon and constituency
statutes aid in changing these beliefs, the lingering effects of the rigid
wealth maximization mindset act as a cultural impediment to actual
corporate social responsibility. Creating a new corporate form that requires
directors and officers to consider stakeholder interests can help to remove
this impediment.
Opponents of the legislation argue that a company choosing to
incorporate as a public benefit corporation is an unviable and unsustainable
business model.94 Such pundits argue that being a public benefit
corporation limits a company’s ability to raise capital because investors are
unlikely to invest in companies that are unwilling and unable to prioritize
their interests.95 In response, proponents of the legislation argue that the
demand for socially responsible employers, products, and investment
opportunities has indicated otherwise.96 Given recent scandals in both the
non-profit and for-profit sectors, some investors prefer to fund companies
that focus on long-term sustainability and transparency. Investors view
corporations with strong governance practices as sound investment
opportunities and are willing to invest in these companies despite the fact
that their short-term interests may be subordinate to sustainable
decision-making.
The United States Forum for Sustainable and
Responsible Investment quantified this demand in its 2014 report on United
States Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investing Trends.97 According
to the Forum, “the total US-domiciled assets under management using
[sustainable, responsible and impact investing] strategies expanded from
$3.74 trillion at the start of 2012 to $6.57 trillion at the start of 2014, an
increase of 76 percent.”98 Key drivers of this trend include the increasing
incorporation of environmental, social, and governance factors in money
managers’ investment analysis and portfolio constructions.99 In gathering

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Anna R. Kimbrell, Benefit Corporation Legislation: An Opportunity for Kansas to
Welcome Social Enterprises, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 565 (2013).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Report on U.S. Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investing Trends 2014, THE
FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT (2014), http://www.ussif.org/Files/
Publications/SIF_Trends_14.F.ES.pdf.
98. Id. at 12.
99. Id. at 15.
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data for the report, eighty percent of these money managers cited client
demand as their motivation for including these factors.
Proponents would also argue that the legislation has already been
proven to be a viable business model.100 Currently, there are 780 benefit
corporations incorporated across the country.101 Some of the more notable
corporations include multinationals like Home Care Associates, Method
Products, Patagonia, Plum, Greyston Bakery, and the Rasmussen
Colleges.102
IV. RECOMMENDATION
There are several critiques of the model benefit corporation legislation
and many are meritorious. Commentators have characterized such
legislation as untested, ambiguous, and uncertain.103 Pundits have also
criticized this legislation for a “perceived lack of director accountability and
enforcement mechanisms . . . .”104 In states like Michigan and North
Carolina, legislators and lobbies defeated this proposed legislation by
“claim[ing] that benefit corporations create a false dichotomy between
‘good’ and ‘bad’ business.”105 Other critics argue that benefit corporations
are “unnecessary and that current corporate law is adequate to
accommodate mission-driven businesses . . . .”106 These critics may have
merit, just as the legislation may have value.
There is an ongoing debate as to the necessity and value of adopting
public benefit corporation legislation. Lawyers, business people, and
legislators across the country continue to weigh the pros and cons of the
new corporate form. Others choose to wait and watch states that have
adopted the legislation. Given the complexity of the issue, this note is not
intended to provide a conclusive answer as to whether the corporate form is
definitively right or wrong for North Dakota. Rather, it should serve as a
mechanism for highlighting some of the existing gaps in North Dakota’s
corporate laws. Discussing public benefit corporation legislation is an
interesting approach to resolving some of these short-comings.

100. Kimbrell, supra note 95, at 565.
101. Legislative
Talking
Points,
BENEFIT
CORP.
INFO.
CENTER,
http://benefitcorp net/legislators/legislative-talking-points.
102. Id.
103. Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s
Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS. BUS. L.J. 247, 249 (2014).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Kimbrell, supra note 95, at 565.
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V. CONCLUSION
In 2007, North Dakota “enacted the nation’s most shareholder-friendly
corporate governance law” in a battle against other states for companies
seeking to incorporate.107 Delaware is well established as the most popular
state for incorporation and is subsequently North Dakota’s largest
competitor. Although Delaware, like North Dakota, prides itself on being a
shareholder-friendly state, Delaware amended its corporate law to include
public benefit corporations on August 1, 2013.108 Delaware has recognized
the gaps in existing corporate law and pursued the public benefit
corporation as a possible solution. Delaware’s approach is to attract
companies by affording incorporators with increased flexibility. Delaware
is a leader in corporate law. As a state that is undergoing increased
economic expansion and is receiving increased investment, North Dakota
should continue to dialogue about this new corporate form.
Rujeko Muza*

107. Cari Tuna, Shareholders Ponder North Dakota Law, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 8, 2008),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122852051008284099.
108. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 361 (2013).
* 2016 J.D./M.B.A. Candidate at the University of North Dakota School of Law. Many
thanks to my mother for her continued love and support. I would also like to thank Christyne J.
Vachon for her guidance in choosing this topic.

